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NOTES & COMMENTS 
 
Exclusive Groove: How Modern 
Substantial Similarity Law Invites 
Attenuated Infringement Claims at the 
Expense of Innovation and Sustainability 
in the Music Industry 
MARK KUIVILA* 
As of 2015, the American entertainment market was 
worth about $600 billion, and it is projected to substantially 
exceed that figure in coming years.1 The global entertain-
ment industry is worth about $2 trillion, meaning the U.S. is 
responsible for over a quarter of total global entertainment 
revenue.2 These statistics illustrate the staggering impact of 
the American entertainment industry on the global markets 
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to 
thank Professor Andres Sawicki for his valuable guidance during the writing pro-
cess and Professor Lily Levi, whose Copyright class inspired this paper. I would 
also like to thank my loving and supportive parents, without whom I would be 
nothing; Brittany Sherwood, my girlfriend and partner, for her love, encourage-
ment, and—most importantly—patience; and my other friends and family for their 
constant encouragement. 
 1 The International Trade Administration projects that U.S. entertainment 
and media markets will exceed $700 billion in total value by 2018. ANDREA 
DASILVA, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 2015 TOP MARKETS REPORT: MEDIA AND 
ENTERTAINMENT 3 (2015), available at http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Media_
and_Entertainment_Top_Markets_Report.pdf. See also Paul Bond, Study: Global 
Entertainment Industry Poised to Top $2 Trillion in 2016, BILLBOARD (June 5, 
2013), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/global/1565728/study-global-
entertainment-industry-poised-to-top-2-trillion-in. 
 2 Bond, supra note 1. See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 6 (predicting that the 
global entertainment and media industry will be worth $2.3 trillion by 2018). 
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for film, television, and music. The American music industry 
is particularly dominant in its global market, earning half of 
world-wide sync revenues and accounting for nearly a third 
of all global music revenue.3 Entertainment is clearly the 
United States’ chief cultural export and has a profound ef-
fect on the country’s international image. 
The figures above show the integral position of Ameri-
can media in the global market and the importance of stud-
ying and understanding the entertainment industries. Be-
cause of the country’s influential role in media, U.S. copy-
right law, as it pertains to these industries, has a significant 
impact on the fundamental structures of both domestic and 
international entertainment business.4 However, a large 
portion of the common dialogue surrounding issues in U.S. 
copyright law can be dominated by vague policy arguments 
rather than more objective economic analysis. This article 
seeks to blend the policy-based and empirical perspectives, 
exploring the implications of U.S. copyright law on artistic 
culture and creative industry itself as an economic system. It 
will focus on the particularly fickle and confusing area of 
“music law” and how the current framework is inapplicable 
to modern music culture and destructive to the music indus-
try as a whole. 
                                                                                                             
 3 Sync revenues are derived from “sync licenses” which allow the creator of 
a visual work to use a piece of music as accompaniment for a fee. These licenses 
cover compositions used in visual mediums including movies, TV shows, adver-
tisements, and video games. See Christopher Shank, Music Synchs Galore, MUSIC 
BUS. J. (Oct. 2013), http://www.thembj.org/2013/10/music-synchs-galore/. Ac-
cording to SelectUSA, “the U.S. has the world’s largest performance rights mar-
ket and earns half of global sync revenues.” Media and Entertainment Spotlight: 
The Media and Entertainment Industry in the United States, SELECTUSA, https://
www.selectusa.gov/media-entertainment-industry-united-states (last visited Sept. 
24, 2016). For country by country divisions of global music revenue, see 
RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF JAPAN, RIAJ YEARBOOK 2015, STATISTICS TRENDS: 
THE RECORDING INDUSTRY IN JAPAN 24 (2015). 
 4 Copyright infringement disputes are governed by the law of the country in 
which the copying took place. U.S. Copyright Office, International Copyright, 
COPYRIGHT.GOV (Nov. 2009), http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl100.html. Given 
the lucrative potential of the U.S. entertainment markets, international entertain-
ment entities seeking to maximize profit realization in the U.S. would have to 
implement monetization strategies tailored to American copyright laws. See id. 






I. PERSPECTIVE ON THE MUSIC INDUSTRY ....................................245 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ........................................................247 
A. Early Music Copyright Infringement Law .......................247 
B. The Development of “Pop” Music and Substantial 
Similarity ..........................................................................248 
C. Arnstein v. Porter and the Lay Listener Test ....................249 
D. Dual Regime of Music Copyright: Music v. Sound ..........251 
III. THE MODERN FRAMEWORK ....................................................253 
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach: The Extrinsic and 
Intrinsic Tests ...................................................................253 
B. Problems with the Ninth Circuit’s Approach ...................257 
C. Music under the Ninth Circuit Tests .................................259 
D. The “Blurred Lines” Case: An Illustrative Example .......260 
IV. EFFECT ON MUSICIANS AND THE INDUSTRY ............................263 
A. Why Musicians are so Agitated: Impact on Artists ..........263 
B. Shooting Themselves in the Foot: Impact on the 
Industry ............................................................................267 
V. POSSIBLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ..........270 
A. Change the Standards and Tests ......................................271 
B. Juries and Experts ............................................................273 
C. One Court .........................................................................275 




In 2013, heirs to the Marvin Gaye estate accused popular musi-
cians Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke of copyright infringe-
ment, asserting that their song “Blurred Lines” was substantially 
similar to the Marvin Gaye hit “Got to Give It Up.”5 After failing to 
                                                                                                             
 5 Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1–2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, 
Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 
2014), available at http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Documents/williamscomplaint.pdf. 
For audio clips of the two songs, see Pharrell Williams, et al. v. Bridgeport Music, 
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reach a settlement, Williams and Thicke sought declaratory judg-
ment in federal court in the Central District of California, arguing 
that the Gayes’ infringement claim was invalid.6 They asserted that 
the plaintiffs’ interests in the underlying musical composition did 
not protect the elements claimed to be similar—namely sound and 
feel.7 In response, the Gayes filed a suit for copyright infringement.8 
Despite wide support for the defense in the music community, Wil-
liams and Thicke were eventually found liable for infringement in 
2015, and a unanimous jury awarded the plaintiffs $7.4 million in 
damages and 50% of the song’s royalties—one the largest judg-
ments in U.S. copyright history.9 
Probably due to “Blurred Lines’” unexpected popularity in 
2013,10 the litigation ignited a polarizing debate regarding the scope 
of copyright in musical compositions. Popular musicians, industry 
professionals, and legal academics alike weighed in on the issue––
many supporting Williams and Thicke.11 The music community was 
                                                                                                             
et al., UNIV. S. CAL. MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT RESOURCE, http://mcir.
usc.edu/inplay/Pages/williams.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). 
 6 Complaint, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 7 Id. at 2. 
 8 Alan Duke, Marvin Gaye heirs sue ‘Blurred Lines’ artists, CNN (Nov. 1, 
2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/showbiz/blurred-lines-law-
suit/. 
 9 These damages were later reduced to $5.3 million, but the royalty interests 
were upheld. Eriq Gardner, ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawsuit: Judge Rejects New Trial, 
BILLBOARD (July 14, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6633554/bl
urred-lines-no-new-trial-pharrell-robin-thicke. 
 10 With “Blurred Lines,” Thicke achieved the rare feat of having a No. 1 Sin-
gle and No. 1 Album on the Billboard Charts simultaneously. Keith Caulfield, 
Robin Thicke’s Rare Double No. 1 Album, No. 1 Song, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER 
(Aug. 9, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/robin-thickes
-rare-double-no-603600. 
 11 See, e.g., Paul Schrodt, Why hundreds of musicians are supporting Phar-
rell and Robin Thicke in ‘Blurred Lines’ appeal, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2016, 
12:09 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-more-than-200-musicians-sup-
port-blurred-lines-appeal-2016-8?r=UK&IR=T [hereinafter Schrodt, Hundreds of 
Musicians] (Discussing that over 200 musicians signed an amicus brief on August 
30, 2016 supporting Williams and Thicke’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit); Jody 
Rosen, Questlove on Working With Elvis Costello, Miley’s Twerking, and His 
Lunchtime DJ Sets, VULTURE (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.                       
vulture.com/2013/09/questlove-on-his-new-album-with-elvis-costello.html (Ex-
pressing artist Questlove’s support for Williams and Thicke); Jordan Pearson, The 
Clear Downside to the ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict, MOTHERBOARD (March 11, 2015, 
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particularly agitated by the possibility of what it saw as a permissi-
ble or even creatively necessary musical reference being categorized 
as infringement.12 Additionally, many commentators believed the 
suit set a dangerous precedent that might encourage a destructive 
and already far too common practice in the music industry: com-
moditizing infringement litigation potential.13 
Students and practitioners of patent law are likely familiar with 
“patent trolls.” These entities own a diverse array of patents with no 
intention of actually using them practically.14 Instead, they monetize 
these holdings by licensing them to companies that need the tech-
nology and suing those parties that infringe them.15 Relatively re-
cently, others began applying a similar strategy to music copyright 
holdings; its practitioners are colloquially referred to as “sample 
trolls.”16 These entities specialize in searching for and exploiting po-
tential infringement claims against their rights-holdings, many times 
                                                                                                             
10:23 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-clear-downside-to-the-blurred-
lines-verdict (discussing a copyright activist’s viewpoint on the verdict); Paul 
Schrodt, The $5 million ‘Blurred Lines’ legal fight over the song’s ‘vibe’ could 
permanently change the music industry, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 15, 2015, 12:05 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/blurred-lines-case-music-copyright-2015-
12 [hereinafter Schrodt, Legal Fight] (discussing the possible consequences of the 
ruling on the music industry). 
 12 Schrodt, Hundreds of Musicians, supra note 11. See, e.g., Mark Swed, 
‘Blurred Lines’ verdict would rock Amadeus and other great composers, LA 
TIMES (March 14, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts
/la-et-cm-blurred-lines-classical-notebook-20150314-column.html. Pearson, su-
pra note 11. 
 13 Peter Kirn, Robin Thicke Judgment: The Day Copyright Law Died, Again, 
CDM, (March 11, 2015), http://cdm.link/2015/03/robin-thicke-judgment-day-
copyright-law-died/; Sherwin Siy, On “Blurred Lines,” Copyright Infringement, 
and “Sample Trolls”, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 20, 2013), https://www.publick
nowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/blurred-lines-copyright-infringement-and-samp. 
See Schrodt, Legal Fight, supra note 11; Charles Cronin, I Hear America Suing: 
Music Copyright Infringement in the Era of Electronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 
1187, 1187–88 (2014). 
 14 Here, “practically” means actually using the patent for its intended pur-
pose. J. Jason Williams, et al., Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 368, 368 n.1 (2010). 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Tim Wu, The shady one-man corporation that’s destroying hip-hop, 
SLATE (Nov. 16, 2006, 1:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culture-
box/2006/11/jayz_versus_the_sample_troll.htm; Siy, supra note 13; Kirn, supra 
note 13. For a more detailed discussion of this practice and “copyright trolls,” see 
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based on unauthorized sampling.17 Broad standards for finding cop-
yright infringement based on similarity like those applied in the 
“Blurred Lines” case might give sample trolls a new opportunity for 
exploitation.18 Even more concerning is the possibility of publishers 
and record labels being inspired by this practice and utilizing similar 
strategies as a component of their business models; some evidence 
seems to suggest they may already be doing so.19 
Even though the statistics discussed earlier in this Note may 
seem to indicate that the domestic and global music markets are sta-
ble and healthy, they are in fact in the midst of a major reorganiza-
tion.20 With the rise of home recording and digital production, the 
market has been saturated with new music, leading to a rise in the 
importance of independent artists and labels.21 Most importantly, the 
classic model by which an entertainment entity might exploit music 
product is no longer reliable.22 Peer-to-peer file sharing and digital 
distribution have had a profound effect on the market for music, re-
quiring traditionally structured entertainment businesses to redesign 
their profit schemes or risk obsolescence.23 There are more listeners 
and musicians than ever before, but the industry remains unsure how 
to combine the two into a profitable and sustainable system.24 
Because the industry can no longer rely on record sales as a 
foundational profit tool, these new business models will have to take 
advantage of diverse exploitation opportunities that reflect music’s 
                                                                                                             
James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copy-
right Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 86 
(2012). 
 17 DeBriyn, supra note 16, at 86; Wu supra note 16; Siy, supra note 13; Kirn, 
supra note 13. 
 18 See Siy, supra note 13; Kirn, supra note 13. 
 19 See DeBriyn, supra note 16, at 79, 82. Recently, there has also been a wave 
of increasingly attenuated substantial similarity claims being brought by publish-
ers and record labels rather than the original artists. For examples, see infra Sec-
tions IV. A. & B. 
 20 DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MICHAEL MASNICK ET AL., THE SKY IS 
RISING: 2014 EDITION 3–5 (2014). 
 21 See MASNICK, supra note 20, at 4. 
 22 DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5. 
 23 See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 4–5. 
 24 DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 8–9. 
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shifting economic locus.25 Under the current American copyright re-
gime, broad interpretation of standards for finding actionable in-
fringement have created a tempting new low-risk-high-reward mon-
etization outlet in profiting from infringement disputes.26 Sample 
trolls, record labels, publishers, and private rights-holders alike can 
exploit these standards and use infringement claims based on simi-
larity as a profit tool.27 
With the democratization of production technology and the 
overall simplification of musical styles, the chances of unconscious 
or even coincidental copying have greatly increased.28 Simply put, 
the more music there is, the more likely it is that one piece will sound 
substantially similar to another.29 Additionally, broad and convo-
luted substantial similarity standards make for outstandingly unpre-
dictable jury decisions.30 This high potential for perceived similarity 
and low confidence in jury decisions has made industry participants 
increasingly skittish when confronted with potential infringement 
disputes, quickly resorting to settlement rather than defending 
against the claimant.31 
This Note will argue that the current standards for finding copy-
right infringement of musical compositions are overly broad and all 
but inapplicable to modern music business and culture. Addition-
ally, these broad standards invite the destructive trend of monetizing 
copyright interests through litigation potential, harming both musi-
cians and the market for music itself.32 The first part of this Note 
will review the current condition of the music industry and why in-
fringement monetization has become a tempting profit opportunity. 
The second part will briefly discuss the history of U.S. copyright 
                                                                                                             
 25 DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5, 9. 
 26 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1187–88. 
 27 See Kirn, supra note 13. 
 28 Id. 
 29 This observation is discussed at greater length later in this note. See infra 
Section IV. A. 
 30 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1188. 
 31 Id. 
 32 It should be noted that these issues are not exclusive to the entertainment 
industry, and all creative industries are potentially at risk for a similar wave of 
damaging litigation. For a broader discussion of copyright dispute monetization 
and its impact on other industries, see generally DeBriyn, supra note 16. 
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law as it pertains to musical compositions. The third part will ana-
lyze the components and application of modern infringement stand-
ards, using the Ninth Circuit’s approach and the “Blurred Lines” 
case as illustrative examples. The fourth part addresses potential ef-
fects of these standards on artists and the music industry as a whole. 
And finally, the fifth part will explore proposed solutions to the per-
ceived inequities inherent in our current infringement structure, as 
well as the complicated implications of each. This Note will propose 
a comprehensive restructuring of the current framework by blending 
commonly suggested proposals into one consistent system. 
I. PERSPECTIVE ON THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 
In the mid to late 2000s, the driving forces behind the music in-
dustry for the previous fifty years seemed paralyzed.33 Piracy and 
peer-to-peer file sharing were causing substantial losses for industry 
participants,34 and these disruptive technologies had rendered tradi-
tional monetization strategies unreliable.35 The industry as a whole 
was forced to reorganize and develop profit models that reflected 
music’s shifting economic value in the face of new and innovative 
industry participants.36 
As of 2016, much of the remaining “doom and gloom” surround-
ing entertainment investment generally is misguided, and the media 
industries as a whole are in the midst of a global renaissance of cre-
ative content.37 Film and TV investment has been steadily rising 
since 2000, and both industries have reached somewhat of a “golden 
age.”38 The accessibility of inexpensive and easy-to-use creative 
production tools spurred staggering growth in creative output over 
the last decade,39 and digital distribution platforms allow for 
                                                                                                             
 33 See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 6–7. 
 34 See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4, 13. There was a sharp decrease in music 
royalty revenues during this time period, and record sales, which had steadily 
grown since the early 2000’s, leveled off. See MASNICK, supra note 20, at 6–7. 
 35 See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4, 13; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5, 9. 
 36 See DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4, 13; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 3, 5. 
 37 MASNICK, supra note 20, at 3. 
 38 From 1990 to 2010, movie investment more than doubled from less than 
$11 billion to just short of $24 billion. Id. at 2. 
 39 Id. at 4. 
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cheap—or even free—global marketing proliferation, making it eas-
ier for independent artists to achieve widespread popularity.40 There 
is more content than ever, and profit exploitation opportunities in 
the new corpus are vast and diverse.41 
Even though more money and content are flowing through the 
entertainment industries than a decade ago, the profit distributions 
are vastly different.42 Democratization in the industry has shaken the 
dominant position of the industry’s major players and spread profit 
distributions across a wider array of independent studios, publishers, 
and labels.43 This is particularly true in the music industry where a 
substantial amount of investment interest has been directed towards 
access platforms rather than content development.44 Additionally 
because album sales are no longer reliable profit generators, industry 
players must take advantage of more diverse exploitation opportu-
nities.45 For example, likely due to the impersonal nature of digital 
distribution, there has been a spike in consumer demand for live mu-
sic experiences, stimulating a wave of investor interest in music fes-
tivals and venues.46 
The music industry is in a better position than it was a decade 
ago, but its investment market is still fragile.47 Even though the live 
music industry has grown substantially over the last few years, some 
analysts are skeptical of the model’s sustainability, and there have 
already been tribulations in the burgeoning market.48 If the live mu-
                                                                                                             
 40 See id. 
 41 See id.; DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4. 
 42 MASNICK, supra note 20, at 3–4. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See id. at 4, 8. See, e.g., Douglas Macmillan, et al., Spotify Raises $1 Billion 
in Debt Financing, WALL ST. J. (March 29, 2016, 6:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/spotify-raises-1-billion-in-debt-financing-1459284467. 
 45 DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4; MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5, 9. 
 46 MASNICK, supra note 20, at 7. 
 47 See id.; DASILVA, supra note 1, at 4. See, e.g., Ryan Mac, The Fall Of SFX: 
From Billion Dollar Company To Bankruptcy Watch, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2015, 
6:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2015/08/24/the-fall-of-an-edm-
empire-sfx/#2715e4857a0be9b695f8c077. 
 48 MASNICK, supra note 20, at 4. Publicly traded EDM festival giant SFX 
recently filed for bankruptcy to aide in its reorganization despite widespread con-
fidence in the company’s model and management. This decision will inject more 
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sic bubble were to collapse, the industry might confront issues sim-
ilar to those that arose a decade ago. Uncertainty among labels and 
publishers as to the future of music monetization schemes will only 
exacerbate apprehension in music investment.49 
Evidence seems to suggest that in reaction, industry participants 
are more frequently using copyright infringement claims as a way 
of garnering profits from rights-holdings.50 To avoid expensive and 
unpredictable litigation, those accused of infringement are quick to 
settle claims by paying out lump sums or granting royalty participa-
tions while risk to the claimant in accusing a supposed infringer re-
mains nugatory.51 Modern copyright infringement standards for mu-
sic compositions foster this practice to the detriment of artists and 
the music industry as a whole. 
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. Early Music Copyright Infringement Law 
To appreciate the highly problematic nature of modern music 
law, it is important to understand its historical context. Even though 
it may seem surprising in retrospect, “music” has not always been 
considered copyrightable material.52 English common law did not 
extended protection to musical compositions until 1777 when Jo-
hann Christian Bach won an infringement suit against a London mu-
sic publisher for unauthorized printing and distribution of his sona-
tas.53 In the U.S., compositions were not protected until 1831 when 
                                                                                                             
uncertainty into the music festival market which has become somewhat of a cor-
nerstone of the modern popular music model. Mac, supra note 47; Ben Sisario, 
SFX Entertainment Declares Bankruptcy, NY TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/02/02/business/media/sfx-entertainment-declares-bankruptcy.
html?_r=0. 
 49 See MASNICK, supra note 20, at 5. 
 50 See Schrodt, Legal Fight, supra note 11; Cronin, supra note 13, at 1187–
88; Ali Sternburg, Why Are We Seeing New Sampling Suits Over Old Songs?, 
PROJECT DISCO (April 9, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-prop-
erty/040914-why-are-we-seeing-new-sampling-suits-over-old-songs/#.V-GSxaIr
Isl. For more examples of these suits, see infra Sections IV. A. & B. 
 51 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1187–88. 
 52 Id. at 1194. 
 53 Id. at 1194–95. 
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Congress first revised the Copyright Act of 1790 to specifically in-
clude musical works.54 
Early music infringement disputes in Britain and the U.S. were 
similar, in that claims were based on reproduction of the work in 
totality rather than misappropriation of compositional portions.55 
However, unlike early British disputes which generally dealt with 
serious works like Bach’s, even early infringement claims in the 
U.S. “dealt with less rarified works.”56 To profit from their compo-
sitions, American musicians needed to fill gaps in the European 
canon that appealed to other aspects of American musical taste.57 
By the early 1900s, pianos were a popular household article and 
the publication and sale of sheet music had grown into formidable 
industries.58 The advent of public radio in the early century created 
yet another profitable market for the distribution and consumption 
of music.59 At the forefront of this new industry were the songwrit-
ers and music publishers of New York’s Tin Pan Alley who held a 
dominant role in the popular music industry from the late 1800s until 
the advent of ‘Rock & Roll’ in the 1950s.60 
B. The Development of “Pop” Music and Substantial Similarity 
The modern framework of music copyright originated in re-
sponse to the rise of Tin Pan Alley and the flourishing market for 
popular music at the turn of the twentieth century.61 Courts struggled 
                                                                                                             
 54 Id. at 1195. 
 55 Id. at 1208. 
 56 Id. at 1198. Because the Copyright Act only applied to domestically pro-
duced works until 1891, publishers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
could readily distribute serious European works without license. Consequently, 
American musicians generally focused on the production of simpler works meant 
for a wider audience. See id. at 1200–01. 
 57 Id. at 1200–01. 
 58 Id. at 1205–06. Because sheet music was the primary distribution medium 
for musical compositions at the time, these new popular compositions were sim-
pler than more serious works so as to be easily replicated by amateur performers. 
Id. at 1204–06. During this time period, suits based on infringement of the perfor-
mance right became more common. However, claims for infringement of the per-
formance right were still based on unauthorized performance of the work in total-
ity. Id. at 1208. 
 59 Id. at 1207. 
 60 See generally id. at 1204–07. 
 61 See id. at 1204. 
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to develop standards that would be applicable to this new kind of 
music while protecting its growing economic value.62 The resulting 
case law established some of the more problematic and hotly de-
bated doctrines of American music law.63 By this time, courts had 
recognized that limiting the scope of copyright protection to the re-
production or performance of only the work’s literal expression 
would allow infringers to avoid prosecution through immaterial var-
iations.64 However, offering overbroad protection could blur the dis-
tinction between copyrightable expression and mere ideas, so the 
doctrine of substantial similarity developed to resolve that issue.65 
Under the substantial similarity doctrine, a plaintiff rights-
holder can win on an infringement claim by showing: 1) ownership 
of a valid copyrighted work; 2) that the defendant in fact copied the 
plaintiff’s protected work (commonly referred to as access); and 3) 
that the resultant work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s orig-
inal (also known as unlawful appropriation).66 This broader stand-
ard for infringement and the success of Tin Pan Alley songwriters 
invited a new wave of claims brought by songwriters seeking to cap-
italize on the industry’s burgeoning economic opportunities.67 The 
simple nature of popular music at the time lowered the amount of 
original copyrightable content in compositions, and plaintiffs’ 
claims for infringement became more abstracted.68 One of the most 
infamous of these plaintiffs was the litigious and mentally ill Ira 
Arnstein.69 
C. Arnstein v. Porter and the Lay Listener Test 
Arnstein was notorious for bringing attenuated and ultimately 
unsuccessful suits for copyright infringement against some the most 
popular artists of his time based on minute similarities between the 
                                                                                                             
 62 See id. at 1208–09. 
 63 See id. at 1204, 1208–09. 
 64 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 65 See id. 
 66 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 67 Cronin, supra note 13, at 1208–10. 
 68 Boosey v. Empire Music was the first decision regarding infringement 
based on “qualitatively slight musical similarities between the disputed musical 
works.” Cronin, supra note 13, at 1209. For the original case, see generally 
Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
 69 Cronin, supra note 13, at 1211–12. 
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works.70 In his most memorable escapade, Arnstein sued Cole Por-
ter, claiming the latter had copied one of his protected composi-
tions.71 At trial, Porter successfully motioned for summary judg-
ment, but the decision was reversed on appeal to the Second Cir-
cuit.72 The framework set forth in the Second Circuit’s reversal re-
tains precedential significance to this day and influences infringe-
ment decisions across all media of expressive works.73 
The court determined that substantial subjective similarity was 
a question of fact to be determined by a jury comprised of the work’s 
intended audience.74 According to the court, popular music was 
written for the musically uneducated masses, and only a lay listener 
could properly determine the degree of similarity.75 Thus, the ques-
tion in music infringement cases became whether the defendant took 
“so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners” comprising 
the work’s intended audience as to render the works substantially 
similar.76 In his opinion, Judge Jerome Frank expressed particular 
distaste for allowing expert testimony on the question of substantial 
similarity, stating that to do so would be to treat relatively simple 
popular works like caviar, “and [the] plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
compositions [were] not caviar.” 77 
The Arnstein opinion illustrates an unfortunate sentiment that 
has permeated into the modern discourse surrounding music copy-
right, namely that popular music is somehow less fit for serious anal-
ysis than more “learned” forms.78 This approach to the assessment 
of popular music ignores the value of quantitative and objective 
evaluation by those versed in the artistry, science, and language of 
                                                                                                             
 70 Id. 
 71 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467; see also Cronin, supra note 13, at 1211–13. 
 72 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467. 
 73 Almost all of the circuits have adopted some version of the Second Cir-
cuit’s “Lay Listener Test.” See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1212. 
 74 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
 75 Id. 
 76 The question of subjective substantial similarity determines whether the 
“defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.” Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See, e.g., Cronin, supra note 13, at 1193 (“[W]hat we today consider to be 
popular music, as that term was understood in the 1940s, is actually something 
else—perhaps “popular sound,” or, less charitably, “popular noise.”). 
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music.79 Experiments on this question have shown that lay juries are 
fundamentally ill-equipped to decipher musical similarities but that 
those with previous musical training are objectively more accurate 
in their analysis.80 This issue has only been exacerbated by the in-
creasingly complicated system of modern music copyright. 
D. Dual Regime of Music Copyright: Music v. Sound 
It is important to note that current music copyright law is far 
more complex than it was in the days of Arnstein.81 By the mid-
century, sales for phonorecords had overtaken the market for sheet 
music as the primary avenue for music distribution.82 In response, 
Congress revised the Copyright Act in 1976 as to specifically in-
clude protection for sound recordings.83 Compositions can be sub-
mitted for registration in the form of sound recordings, but only the 
musical elements contained within are protected.84 Copyrights in 
sound recordings were meant to be separate and distinct from the 
protections allotted to the recording’s underlying musical composi-
tion, creating two sets of copyrights in pieces of recorded music.85 
This bifurcated system imposes a distinction between musical ele-
ments and sonic qualities dictated by performance.86 The difference 
between the protections extended to musical compositions and the 
recorded performances that embody them are subtle and, at times, 
confusing. 
To clarify the distinction between compositional and perfor-
mance qualities, consider for example the tradition of “covering” 
songs in music. Musicians frequently perform each other’s songs in 
                                                                                                             
 79 See Jamie Lund, Fixing Music Copyright, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 86–90 
(2013). 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1239. 
 82 Cronin, supra note 13, at 1213, 1213 n.139, 1214. 
 83 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2012); see also Lund, supra note 79, at 69. 
 84 See Lund, supra note 79, at 66–67, 67 n. 35; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND 
RECORDINGS 1 (2012), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56a.pdf (“Sending a 
musical composition in the form of a phonorecord [for example, cassette tape, LP, 
or CD] does not necessarily mean that there is a claim to copyright in the sound 
recording.”). 
 85 Lund, supra note 79, at 66. 
 86 This approach recognizes traditionally accepted distinctions between song-
writers and performers in the musical arts. Id. 
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the style of a different genre with little to no change in the original’s 
underlying melodies, lyrics, and composition. The resulting cover 
might be performed at a different tempo, in a different key, or with 
different rhythmic emphasis, but it is still musically identical to the 
original.87 From a sonic perspective, the cover and the original may 
not be similar at all, and the overall effect of the music may com-
pletely change. In a scenario where identical compositions are per-
formed in different styles, lay listeners are hard-pressed to properly 
identify the level of musical similarity.88 
Further complicating this distinction between music and sound, 
the proliferation of audio recording technology has melded the pro-
cesses of composition and recording.89 Unlike works by Beethoven 
or the Tin Pan Alley songwriters, modern popular songs are rarely 
written out in formal notation before their performance and are often 
composed in tandem with their recording.90 Musicians will fre-
quently make decisions during the recording process with both sonic 
and compositional considerations in mind, and for genres like elec-
tronic music, sonic qualities are a primary authorial consideration.91 
This change in the creative process has made it increasingly difficult 
to differentiate between the sonic and musical expressions in a 
sound recording.92 Problematically, that distinction is integral to an-
alyzing music under modern copyright infringement frameworks. 
                                                                                                             
 87 For an example, listen to Johnny Cash’s cover of “Hurt” by Nine Inch Nails 
and compare with the original. 
 88 See Lund, supra note 79, at 86–88. 
 89 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1215–18. 
 90 Id. 
 91 The proliferation of electronic recording technologies increased authorial 
focus on secondary non-musical elements like dynamics and timbre. Similarly, 
wide use of synthesizers, drum machines, sequencers, and samplers in popular 
genres placed new value on creative sound design, drawing authorial importance 
from the primary musical considerations of traditional composers. See Cronin, 
supra note 13, at 1214, 1218; MARK J. BUTLER, UNLOCKING THE GROOVE: 
RHYTHM, METER, AND MUSICAL DESIGN IN ELECTRONIC DANCE MUSIC, 33 (Ind. 
Univ. Press 2006) (ebook). 
 92 See generally Cronin supra note 13, at 1213–14. 
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III. THE MODERN FRAMEWORK 
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach: The Extrinsic and Intrinsic Tests 
Case law in the Ninth Circuit is some of the most influential in 
the copyright arena93 but, regrettably, illustrates common issues in 
copyright doctrine found across the circuits. As copyright law be-
came more complex and attenuated infringement claims became 
more common, the court worked to develop consistent tests for sub-
stantial similarity that would be applicable across all mediums of 
protected creative works.94 In 1977, television producers Sid and 
Marty Krofft brought suit against McDonald’s for allegedly infring-
ing their children’s television character “H.R. Pufnstuf” by using a 
substantially similar character in advertisements.95 The Kroffts won 
at trial, and McDonald’s appealed to the Ninth Circuit.96 
Influenced by the Second Circuit’s approach, the Krofft court 
sought to create a broadly applicable limiting principle that would 
clearly delineate which specific elements of a creative work were 
protected expressions and which were unprotectable ideas.97 The 
court reasoned that the two-prong framework used by the Second 
Circuit implied this distinction and correctly noted that only ele-
ments of original expression could be considered when determining 
subjective similarity.98 Based on this observation, the court outlined 
a two-step analysis for substantial similarity known as the “extrinsic 
                                                                                                             
 93 This is due to the rise of Southern California as the United States entertain-
ment epicenter. 
 94 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod.’s, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 
F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 95 Id. at 1160. 
 96 Id. at 1160–61. 
 97 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (expounding the lay 
listener test); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(expounding the abstractions test); Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163–65, (drawing influ-
ence from both). 
 98 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164–65. 
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and intrinsic tests.”99 Later cases have extensively altered the origi-
nal tests to clarify their application but still maintain the same two-
pronged structure.100 
Under current interpretations, the extrinsic component of the 
two-part test refers to an objective comparison of “all objective man-
ifestations of expression” in the works based on “articulable simi-
larities.”101 Though ultimately a question for the trier of fact, the 
question of extrinsic similarity can often be resolved as a matter of 
law.102 During the extrinsic test, the court can consider external cri-
teria like expert testimony to aid in the necessary “analytical dissec-
tion.”103 
Analytical dissection requires the jury or presiding judge to 
break the works down into their specific expressive elements and 
then compare those elements standing alone for evidence of copying 
measured by substantial similarity.104 Here, the fact finder deter-
mines the scope of protection in the plaintiff’s work by deciding 
which elements are original protected expressions and which are un-
protectable ideas.105 The fact finder must “filter out” the unprotected 
or unprotectable elements and only consider similarities between the 
remaining components.106 
                                                                                                             
 99 The extrinsic test satisfies the first requirement of copying in fact, while 
the intrinsic addresses unlawful appropriation measured by subjective substantial 
similarity. Id. at 1164–65. 
 100 See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 101 Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822. 
 102 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
 103 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 
2014 WL 7877773, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 
841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 104 Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6; Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822–23. 
 105 See Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6; Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822–23. 
 106 Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6; “A court “must take care to inquire 
only whether ‘the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially similar.’” 
Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822–23. Courts have defined the extrinsic test quite incon-
sistently. Some decisions have expounded that the extrinsic test is actually a test 
for both similarity of ideas and expression with the objective of showing copying 
in fact. But, those same decisions state that the fact finder must filter out un-pro-
tectable elements and only consider those that are protected. If that were actually 
the case, the question of similarity in idea would be irrelevant because ideas are 
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It must be noted here that not all components of a work have to 
be original expressions for the work as a whole to receive copyright 
protection.107 Additionally, a sufficiently original arrangement of in-
dividually unprotectable elements can itself constitute a protectable 
expression.108 In the Ninth Circuit, this principle is commonly re-
ferred to as the Metcalf doctrine. The court has stated that the idea–
expression distinction used for analytical dissection during the ex-
trinsic test does not obscure the Metcalf doctrine’s applicability.109 
As its limiting principles, the court primarily uses the doctrines of 
merger and scénes á faire to determine what elements in a work are 
unprotectable and should be filtered.110 
                                                                                                             
not protectable expression. See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 107 See Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 108 “Each note in a scale, for example, is not protectable, but a pattern of notes 
in a tune may earn copyright protection.” Id. The arrangement of these compo-
nents becomes an expression itself, but the content of those components remains 
un-protectable. See id. 
 109 Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6; Applying the extrinsic test to protect-
able arrangements of individually un-protectable elements is particularly difficult. 
During analytical dissection, the fact finder would have to ignore the content of 
unprotected individual ideas but somehow consider the effect of their arrangement 
for comparison. See generally Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848. It should be noted that 
music compositions are fundamentally arrangements of un-protectable compo-
nents. See id. A chord progression or rhythm alone—unless outstandingly 
unique—would not qualify for copyright protection, but an arrangement of those 
components would. See id. The “Blurred Lines” case eventually turns on this ob-
servation. 
 110 “[W]hen an idea and its expression are indistinguishable,” they are said to 
have merged, and “the expression will only be protected against near identical 
copying.” Apple, 35 F.3d at 1444. When similar features are ‘as a practical matter 
indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given [idea],’” those com-
ponents are considered scénes á faire and are not protected under copyright. Id. 
However, these doctrines alone are not adequate guides for distinguishing expres-
sions from ideas during analytical dissection. Taken in tandem with the Metcalf 
doctrine, original arrangements of scénes á faire or merged components would 
receive protection, but the court provides little guidance as to what particular qual-
ities of these arrangements the jury should consider expressive during analytical 
dissection. See generally Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848. These doctrines are also diffi-
cult to apply to the varied works protected by copyright. See id. For example, it is 
clear that in a narrative work the concept of star crossed lovers is scénes á faire, 
but application of that doctrine to choreography, sculpture, or software would be 
more difficult. 
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The intrinsic portion of the framework involves a subjective de-
termination of similarity in the “total concept and feel” of the works’ 
protected expressions from the perspective of an “ordinary reasona-
ble audience.”111 Here, the fact finder must decide whether those 
similarities are substantial enough to constitute unlawful appropria-
tion by the defendant.112 Because the test is meant to be purely sub-
jective, the Ninth Circuit does not allow expert testimony or analyt-
ical dissection during the intrinsic portion, and the question is ex-
clusively left to the jury.113 Instead of dissecting the works into their 
individual expressive elements and comparing them in isolation, the 
jury must subjectively consider the similarities between the “total 
concept and feel” of both works’ protectable expressions as a 
whole.114 
As noted above, to fix the scope of protection extended to a par-
ticular work the fact finder must determine which elements of the 
work are protected original expressions and filter the unprotectable 
elements during the extrinsic test.115 According to the court, the fact 
finder should apply dissection in the extrinsic test and compare those 
elements in isolation.116 Then, the jury must subjectively compare 
the “total concept and feel” of the remaining protectable compo-
nents as a whole without regard to evidence presented for the extrin-
sic analysis and observations made during analytical dissection.117 
The lack of definitive boundaries between protectable expressions 
and unprotectable ideas for jurors to follow suggests a “liberal 
                                                                                                             
 111 Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822. 
 112 See id. 
 113 “Because this is an intrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony 
are not appropriate.” Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod.’s, Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). “For the purposes of summary judg-
ment, only the extrinsic test is important because the subjective question whether 
works are intrinsically similar must be left to the jury.” Swirsky v. Carey, 376 
F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 114 See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 (disallowing analytical dissection); Cavalier, 
297 F.3d at 822 (requiring analysis of “total concept and feel”). 
 115 Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *6. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822.; Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 (disallowing ana-
lytical dissection and consideration of expert testimony during intrinsic test). 
2016] EXCLUSIVE GROOVE 257 
 
amount of subjectivity” in the determination.118 This subjectivity 
mires an already complicated standard, further confusing jurors and 
producing inconsistent precedent with less predictable outcomes.119 
B. Problems with the Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
If you find this system cumbersome and esoteric that is because, 
in fact, it is. Commentators frequently critique the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach as convoluted and confusing to judges, jurors, and practi-
tioners.120 This breakdown in communication between the bench 
and jury leads to erratic decisions, inviting more attenuated claims 
and encouraging infringement itself.121 Furthermore, disallowing 
expert testimony to clarify appropriate application of the intrinsic 
test to the medium in question only exacerbates this disconnect.122 
Both infringers and plaintiffs are more likely to abuse the system 
when outcomes are more erratic, believing that it is worth it to “roll 
the dice” as the potential benefits outweigh the risk.123 
The Ninth Circuit’s two-pronged test highlights a major issue in 
judicial precedent for copyright law generally—the limited applica-
bility of legal vocabulary to the analysis of creative works. The pon-
tifications of experts, however exclusive in their accessibility, are at 
least consistent in that they draw from a commonly accepted under-
standing of the medium.124 Unlike the legalisms of copyright law, 
the vocabulary of creative critique is tailored to the specific medium 
                                                                                                             
 118 Nicholas R. Monlux, An Invitation for Infringement: How the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s Extrinsic and Intrinsic Similarity Tests Encourage Infringement: An Anal-
ysis Using Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, 56 J., COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
543, 553 (2008). 
 119 See id. 
 120 See, e.g., Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation 
of Assessing Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & 
POL’Y 1375, 1377 (2007); Miah Rosenberg, Do You Hear What I Hear?: Expert 
Testimony in Music Infringement Cases in the Ninth Circuit, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1669, 1688–89 (2006); Montgomery Frankel, From Krofft to Shaw, and 
Beyond, 40 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 429, 453 (1990); Monlux, supra note 118, at 
544. 
 121 See Monlux, supra note 118, at 545. 
 122 Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 1676–77. 
 123 See Monlux, supra note 118, at 545. 
 124 But even though expert evaluations are consistent in their methods, these 
accepted approaches may not fall within the boundaries of judicial doctrine. See 
Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 1689. 
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it seeks to analyze. As courts have recognized, judges are poor 
judges of art,125 and judicial doctrines can prove more confusing 
than enlightening. This convolution is particularly problematic 
when applying standards meant to encompass all creative works ra-
ther than ones tailored to the medium in question. 
However carefully constructed, the tests provide no guidance on 
their application to varying creative mediums or the weight provided 
to each test.126 The system may be appropriate in its application to 
narrative works where merged and scénes á faire elements are more 
easily identified, but it seems far less effective when applied to art 
forms where the lines between idea and expression are vague.127 Fil-
tration seems particularly difficult when a work consists of copy-
rightable arrangements of uncopyrightable components protectable 
under the Metcalf doctrine. In these cases, application of the “total 
concept” doctrine becomes dangerously close to extending protec-
tion to uncopyrightable and ill-defined ideas like genre, style, or 
vibe.128 
                                                                                                             
 125 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 
(1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial il-
lustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme 
some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty 
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in 
which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether 
the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection 
when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pic-
tures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they com-
mand the interest of any public, they have a commercial value -- it would be bold 
to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value -- and the taste of any 
public is not to be treated with contempt.”). 
 126 Frankel, supra note 120, at 453. 
 127 See Frankel, supra note 120, at 433; see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 128 The outcome of Williams v. Bridgeport Music Inc. illustrates the implica-
tions of this imprecise framework. See generally Williams v. Bridgeport Music, 
Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 
2014). 
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C. Music under the Ninth Circuit Tests 
The Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic and intrinsic system is quite diffi-
cult to apply in cases regarding recorded musical compositions.129 
As explained earlier, a piece of recorded music embodies two dis-
tinct copyrights––one in the recording itself and another in its un-
derlying musical composition.130 However firm the distinction be-
tween music and sound was originally designed to be, application of 
the analytical dissection and “total concept” approach essentially re-
quires distortion of that delineation. 
This would be particularly true in cases regarding works that 
were written and recorded contemporaneously. Composition and 
performance overlap when musical decisions are made as to produce 
particular sonic effects normally dictated by the composition’s per-
formance. In these cases, the rights extended to the recording and its 
underlying composition are easily confused but remain integral to 
proper application of the extrinsic-intrinsic tests. For an example of 
this distinction in practice under Ninth Circuit standards, consider 
the surprisingly well-decided case of Newton v. Diamond.131 
In Newton, flautist James W. Newton brought an infringement 
suit against the Beastie Boys claiming the latter had unlawfully ap-
propriated a portion of his composition “Choir” by sampling the 
song’s opening riff without license.132 The Beastie Boys had ob-
tained a license from Newton’s record label to sample the recorded 
material but had not acquired a license to use the underlying com-
position.133 The registered score for “Choir” contained minimal 
original musical content and only a few vague performance instruc-
tions.134 The recording, on the other hand, elaborated on the basic 
melodies and contained sonic performance qualities not dictated by 
                                                                                                             
 129 “The application of the extrinsic test, which assesses substantial similarity 
of ideas and expression, to music compositions is a somewhat unnatural task 
guided by relatively little precedent.” Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 130 Lund, supra note 79, at 66. 
 131 See generally Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 132 Id. at 1191. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Cronin, supra note 13, at 1228. 
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the notation.135 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that New-
ton’s copyright in the composition did not extend to embellishments 
or performance qualities omitted from the registered score and that 
those elements should be filtered out during the extrinsic test.136 Fur-
thermore, because the defendants had only sampled a three note 
phrase from the score, their use was de minimis and did not infringe 
on Newton’s composition.137 Newton was rightly decided, but more 
recent decisions fail to follow its guidelines. 
D. The “Blurred Lines” Case: An Illustrative Example 
The outcome of Williams v. Bridgeport shows how jurors can 
easily—even understandably—confuse musical and performance 
qualities when applying the Ninth Circuit’s test to compositions.138 
In light of the Newton decision, the outcome of the “Blurred Lines” 
case “appears indefensibly regressive,” being fundamentally at odds 
with traditional Ninth Circuit interpretations of compositional cop-
yright disputes.139 As noted, experiments on the subject have shown 
that lay listeners are ill-equipped to distinguish which qualities of a 
musical work are dictated by its composition and which are products 
of its performance.140 The intersection of the “Lay Listener Test,” 
Metcalf doctrine, and “total concept and feel” approach create a ripe 
opportunity for overly broad interpretation by jurors and erratic sub-
jective decisions.141 
The procedural history of the “Blurred Lines” dispute began 
when—after failing to reach a settlement regarding the potential in-
fringement claim by the Gaye family against them—Pharrell Wil-
liams and Robin Thicke filed an action for declaratory judgment in 
their favor on the question.142 According to Williams and Thicke, 
the Gaye family’s accusation hinged on a perceived similarity be-
tween the sound and feel of “Blurred Lines” and Marvin Gaye’s 
                                                                                                             
 135 Id. 
 136 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193–94. 
 137 Id. at 1196–97; Cronin, supra note 13, at 1229. 
 138 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230–31. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Lund, supra note 79, at 78–86. 
 141 See generally id. 
 142 See generally Complaint, supra note 5, at 2. 
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“Got to Give It Up.”143 In their ultimately unsuccessful complaint 
for declaratory judgment, the artists argued that feel and sound were 
not protected elements of a compositional copyright and that extend-
ing protection to these qualities would give rights-holders ownership 
over entire genres of music.144 Williams and Thicke stated that 
“Blurred Lines” was written to “evoke an era” of music rather than 
to specifically imitate “Got to Give It Up” and that any similar mu-
sical devices between the two were commonly used by other song-
writers of the time or were derived from unprotected elements of the 
underlying composition to Gaye’s work.145 In response, the Gaye 
family filed a suit for infringement, arguing that these similarities 
surpassed mere influence in sound and feel and that the artists had 
unlawfully appropriated protected material from “Got to Give It 
Up.”146 
It must be noted that “Got to Give It Up” was recorded and reg-
istered in 1977 when the 1909 Copyright Act was still in effect.147 
Under the 1909 Act, only written musical notation—and not sound 
recordings—could be submitted for registration of compositional 
works, but Gaye, who could not read or write musical notation, com-
posed and recorded the song in the same process.148 After recording 
the song, Gaye and his publisher submitted a lead sheet prepared by 
a third party for registration that only contained a limited outline of 
the music actually performed on the recording.149 The Gaye family 
argued that the court should consider the recorded version of the 
                                                                                                             
 143 Id. It should be noted that in the official records the court, claimants, and 
expert witnesses refrained from using these words specifically, but the terms were 
used by Williams and Thicke in their complaint. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See id. However, Thicke said in an interview that he and Williams wrote 
“Blurred Lines” to have the same groove as “Got to Give It Up.” See Stelios Phili, 
Robin Thicke on That Banned Video, Collaborating with 2 Chainz and Kendrick 
Lamar, and His New Film, GQ (May 6, 2013 9:20 PM), http://www.gq.com/story
/robin-thicke-interview-blurred-lines-music-video-collaborating-with-2-chainz-
and-kendrick-lamar-mercy. 
 146 Defendants’ Counterclaim at 14, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 
LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014), 
available at http://mcir.usc.edu/inplay/Documents/gayecounterclaim.pdf. 
 147 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 
2014 WL 7877773, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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work when applying the extrinsic test, even though only the lead 
sheet was registered.150 The presiding judge disagreed, finding that 
the plaintiffs’ copyright only protected music contained in the score 
and only the content of the lead sheet could be considered.151 Any-
thing outside of the registered lead sheet had to be filtered from the 
analysis.152 
From an objective standpoint, “Blurred Lines” does not copy 
any literal compositional elements from the registered score for 
“Got to Give It Up.”153 However, with support from expert testi-
mony, the family argued that even though Williams and Thicke had 
not literally copied the composition, the artists had borrowed enough 
elements from the song to produce a substantially similar structure 
and overall effect.154 The family’s experts opined that “Blurred 
Lines” and “Got to Give It Up” were substantially similar in “con-
stellation” of those elements and that these similarities in arrange-
ment were significant enough to satisfy the extrinsic–intrinsic test 
even absent literal copying of the composition’s content.155 
The litigation became a whirlwind of motions and countersuits 
that ultimately culminated in a unanimous jury decision for the 
Gayes.156 Whatever the specific reasoning behind the decision may 
have been, it does seem clear that the jurors were either confused by 
or ignored the distinction between performance and compositional 
elements.157 Because the scores as written were objectively dissim-
ilar, the jury’s decision appeared to be based on external criteria 
from the sound recording or unprotectable sonic and performance 
qualities that should have been filtered from the analysis.158 
                                                                                                             
 150 A lead sheet is a limited outline of the basic musical themes in a song, and 
it generally contains very few performance notes. Id. 
 151 Id. at *10. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at *13. 
 154 See Defendants’ Counterclaim, supra note 146, at 14–15. 
 155 See id. 
 156 See Williams, 2014 WL 7877773, at *1; Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230–
31. 
 157 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1231. 
 158 The jury may also have been influenced by Williams’ and Thicke’s incon-
sistent testimony and perceived dishonesty. Cronin, supra note 13, at 1231, 1231 
n.231. 
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“Blurred Lines” was clearly influenced by “Got to Give It Up,” 
and it is quite reasonable to say that the songs sound similar. How-
ever, when only comparing the protected compositional expressions 
and excluding the unprotected performance qualities, this similarity 
does not rise to the level of copyright infringement on the composi-
tion. The “constellation” of creative decisions that the plaintiffs’ ex-
perts referred to included male falsetto vocals, alternating cowbell 
patterns, and omission of guitar riffs, but all of these qualities are 
unprotectable under past case law.159 This over-application of the 
Metcalf doctrine essentially extends copyright protection in compo-
sitions to instrumentation decisions that are generally the realm of 
recording and performance. But under “total concept and feel,” 
these arrangement qualities are provided more probative weight than 
the individual compositional elements. The music community criti-
cized the decision as being inconsistent with modern music culture 
by making commonly accepted levels of artistic influence actiona-
ble offenses.160 
IV. EFFECT ON MUSICIANS AND THE INDUSTRY 
A. Why Musicians are so Agitated: Impact on Artists 
As applied in Williams, the Ninth Circuit’s system for finding 
infringement has become almost inapplicable to modern music com-
position, and under it, artists can be punished for using culturally 
accepted creative strategies.161 “Total concept and feel” as it pertains 
to music compositions can easily be construed to include perfor-
mance qualities that are not dictated by the underlying music. Ex-
panding the scope of protection in compositions to this degree es-
sentially gives rights-holders the sole privilege to perform songs in 
a particular style and exclusive control over a sound or groove. This 
expansion shifts probative value away from the actual content of the 
music and improperly distorts the boundary between idea and ex-
pression by protecting style rather than composition. 
Under this expanded scope, the protection afforded to seminal 
works of a genre would be inequitably exaggerated and limit artistic 
                                                                                                             
 159 Defendants’ Counterclaim, supra note 146, at 14–15. 
 160 Over 200 artists filed a brief with the Ninth Circuit, supporting Williams’ 
and Thicke’s appeal. Schrodt, Hundreds of Musicians, supra note 11. 
 161 Id.; Swed, supra note 12 (stating that these practices have been accepted 
by musicians for centuries). 
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influence from a substantial portion of culturally important works. 
Certain music has become so influential and pervasive in the collec-
tive cultural and artistic lexicons that the likelihood of substantial 
similarity arising in new works is all but inevitable.162 For example, 
the distinctive performance styles of artists like Michael Jackson 
and James Brown are such definitive examples of their respective 
genres that reference to their works is all but necessary to write 
songs in those styles.163 
With the growing popularity of retro-style songwriting, evoking 
the sound of a culturally relevant artist has become a common prac-
tice welcomed by the listening public, but it might expose artists to 
potential liability.164 Recently, Mark Ronson and his co-authors 
were accused of infringement by a UK music publisher.165 The pub-
lisher claimed that Ronson’s wildly popular “Uptown Funk” in-
fringed on the song “Oops Upside Your Head” by pioneering funk 
group The Gap Band.166 The musical similarities between the two 
songs are minimal and highly common to the funk genre generally, 
but Ronson and his publishers quickly settled with their accusers.167 
Commentators drew parallels between the “Uptown Funk” dispute 
and the “Blurred Lines” litigation, believing Ronson and his team 
settled in order to avoid unpredictable and potentially unfavorable 
litigation.168 
                                                                                                             
 162 See generally Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230. 
 163 The merger and scénes á faire doctrines might be valid defenses against 
this interpretation, but those doctrines are difficult to apply in cases regarding 
compositional infringement. Genres like Rock & Roll and R&B draw heavily on 
musical foundations developed by past artists of genres like Blues and Doo-Wop. 
See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1216. Had these appropriations been considered 
infringement, Rock & Roll would have essentially never existed. Because these 
appropriations were used to develop new genres rather mimic the original, merger 
and scenes-a-faire might not have protected these artists. 
 164 See Joanna Demers, Sound-Alikes, Law, and Style, 83 UMKC L. REV. 303, 
303 (2014) (discussing “retromania” and the popularity of new “sound-alikes”). 
 165 Instead of initiating a legal claim, the publisher sent a request to YouTube 
to flag the song and keep any generated revenue in escrow until the matter was 
resolved. Ed Christman, Inside the New Royalty Split for ‘Uptown Funk’: Who 
Gets Paid What, BILLBOARD (May 4, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/
business/6553861/uptown-funk-royalties-who-gets-paid. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
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Along with exponential growth in the sheer volume of music be-
ing created through accessible and inexpensive digital recording, 
“sound alikes”169 are essentially guaranteed.170 Some might disagree 
with this assessment, believing that composers draw inspiration 
from an unlimited ethereal corpus, but this position would ignore 
two fundamentally limiting qualities of music creation. Firstly, all 
creative works, and especially music, are a product of their author’s 
environment and exposure to other works.171 Secondly, music is a 
limited art that draws from a finite domain of accepted quantitatively 
definable sonic devices.172 The simplification of pop music for mass 
consumption further limits these musical vocabularies and again in-
creases the probability of similarity.173 Other creative mediums do 
not have the same authoritative limits on expression and, conse-
quently, perceived overlap is less likely.174 
                                                                                                             
 169 See Demers, supra note 164, at 309 (“A sound-alike is a recording intended 
to resemble other recorded works, usually popular hits.”). 
 170 Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230. 
 171 From a psychological and philosophical perspective, the concept of artistic 
originality in general is a thin one. It inaccurately frames creative works as spon-
taneous generations independent of the cultural context of their creation. Musi-
cians have always been comfortable with this fact and foster a culture of appro-
priation. The study of music itself is rooted in reference to past works: jazz musi-
cians learn their craft through improvising alterations to canonic standard progres-
sions; and musicians of the classical era were known for re-orchestrating the 
works of their contemporaries, adding to the free flowing creative dialogue of the 
time. See Swed, supra note 12. 
 172 The human ear finds a finite number of tones, intervals, and rhythmic de-
vices pleasing to the ear. More than many other kinds of art, the vocabulary of 
music can be defined in measurable, quantitative values. The relationships be-
tween melodies, rhythms, and harmonies can all be expressed in terms of fre-
quency, measureable time, and ratio-based intervals. The overwhelming majority 
of composed music subscribes to this fundamentally limited set of accepted sonic 
devices and standard structures. This is particularly true in the arena of popular 
music where the authorial objective is listen-ability as opposed to high-art music, 
such as John Cage for example where the objective in many instances is artistic 
exploration. See Tony Phillips, The mathematics of piano tuning: Natural har-
mony, AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y, http://www.ams.org/samplings/feature-col-
umn/fcarc-piano1. For other articles on the subject, see Mathematics of Music, 
AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y, http://www.ams.org/samplings/math-and-music#ar-
ticles. 
 173 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1230. 
 174 For example, compared to the color pallet of visual art, the accepted tonal 
pallet for musical expression is limited. The color “red” is a spectral condition 
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As an example of recent incidental copying, rights-holders to 
Tom Petty’s classic “I Won’t Back Down” accused Sam Smith of 
plagiarizing the song in his Number 1 hit “Stay With Me.”175 As in 
the Ronson dispute, similarity between the two songs is minimal and 
centers around a slight melodic and rhythmic similarity.176 Tom 
Petty himself admitted that the similarity was a “musical accident,” 
but like Ronson, rather than risk an expensive and unpredictable dis-
pute, Smith and his team settled with the publisher.177 
This high probability of similarity is clearly problematic in gen-
res where similarity between works is actually a valued composi-
tional device. Modern electronic dance music like techno, electro, 
and house is made intending for the individual recordings to be 
seamlessly strung together into long format DJ sets.178 As a result, 
these works are generally arrangements of common sonic devices 
used in the genre179 but receive protection under the Metcalf doc-
                                                                                                             
encompassing a diverse range of electromagnetic wavelengths all of which con-
stitute “red” but in different shades. ElectroMagnetic Color, COLOR MATTERS 
https://www.colormatters.com/color-and-science/electromagnetic-color (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2016). Musical compositions, on the other hand, are generally con-
structed from a set of twelve notes, each of which has a precise quantitative defi-
nition known as “equal temperament.” For example, a perfectly tuned Middle C 
has an accepted frequency of 262 Hz (when rounding up), and deviations from 
these standards are rare, particularly in popular music. J. BACKUS, THE 
ACOUSTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MUSIC 153 (1977), available at http://www.audio
logy.org/sites/default/files/ChasinConversionChart.pdf; Tony Phillips, The Math-
ematics of Piano Tuning: Frequencies and Notes, AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y, 
http://www.ams.org/samplings/feature-column/fcarc-piano2. 
 175 Daniel Kreps, Sam Smith on Tom Petty Settlement: ‘Similarities’ but ‘Com-
plete Coincidence’, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.
com/music/news/sam-smith--tom-petty-settlement-20150126. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. According to Petty, the parties resolved the issue amicably, and his pub-
lishers never threatened litigation during the negotiation. However, the quick 
jump to settlement clearly indicates a greater skittishness in the shadow of poten-
tial litigation. Daniel Kreps, Tom Petty on Sam Smith Settlement: ‘No Hard Feel-
ings. These Things Happen’, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.rolling
stone.com/music/news/tom-petty-on-sam-smith-settlement-no-hard-feelings-
these-things-happen-20150129. 
 178 For a discussion on the history of DJ’ing, see BUTLER, supra note 91, at 
37. 
 179 See id. at 206–09. 
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trine. While works of Beethoven and Bach were detailed and com-
plex, these dance songs may only contain a standard four-to-the-
floor rhythm, a simple melody, and textural or atmospheric sonic 
components.180 Under the current copyright standards, these songs 
are almost certainly infringing on works by pioneers of the genre 
like Frankie Knuckles and Giorgio Moroder, but it is unlikely an 
electronic musician would actually assert this to be the case. 
For all of these reasons, broad infringement standards restrict 
creativity in music and improperly punish artists for using tradi-
tional composition techniques. The lines between influence and in-
fringement are far too distorted as to be effectively applicable to a 
modern music culture that heavily values referential and appropriat-
ive works. The threat of litigation prevents artists from expressing 
the context of their creative influence and limits an already confined 
medium of expression. These issues reflect the problems in applying 
modern copyright infringement doctrine to music and the inequita-
ble policy implications of current standards to which the judiciary 
should react. 
B. Shooting Themselves in the Foot: Impact on the Industry 
Like musicians, industry commentators have lamented the 
overly broad application of substantial similarity standards to music 
compositions and criticized it for encouraging an already too com-
mon practice of using infringement disputes as a profit oppor-
tunity.181 Erratic jury decisions invite weaker infringement claims 
brought by plaintiffs with little to lose, particularly when compen-
sating counsel through contingency fees.182 As noted, this lack of 
predictability also encourages defendants to settle earlier in the pro-
cess for fear that they might lose much more at trial; those who do 
not settle could face a capricious and ill-informed jury.183 
Because of the industry’s uncertain position as a whole, the op-
portunity to profit from infringement disputes is a tempting venture 
when seeking to diversify revenue streams. While historically many 
music infringement plaintiffs were amateur songwriters seeking to 
                                                                                                             
 180 See id. 
 181 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1192–93; Siy, supra note 13; Wu, supra note 
16. 
 182 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1192–93, 1243–44. 
 183 See id. at 1188, 1243–44. 
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capitalize on the success of another artist, publishing houses and rec-
ord labels are more frequently parties to these disputes than in the 
past.184 Despite infringement profiteering’s apparent adoption by 
some as a component of their profit schemes, the practice corrodes 
industry sustainability overall. 
In an industry plagued by uncertainty, increased liability poten-
tial is an unwelcomed addition to the already high risks associated 
with investing in new works. In the shadow of infringement poten-
tial, music publishers and record labels, like movie studios, might 
concertedly reject unsolicited submissions to avoid accidental expo-
sure to infringement claims.185 Any new potential rights acquisitions 
will have to be vetted through a comprehensive research process to 
identify any potential liability associated with the work.186 These 
necessary expenses will add more entry barriers to the already ex-
clusive industry and thin the margins on new acquisitions.187 The 
fear of liability and increased costs associated with its avoidance 
will almost certainly chill investment in new music, potentially de-
priving innovative artists of funding and capital. 
Furthermore, rights-holders might choose to monetize culturally 
relevant works through litigation once the primary market for the 
work has cooled. These rights-holders, whether they be publishers, 
labels, sample trolls, or individuals, have less incentive to create, 
distribute, or invest in new works of music than to generate profit 
from current holdings. Evidence suggests that some entities already 
take advantage of this approach by suing for unauthorized sampling 
of classic works just before the statute of limitations has expired on 
                                                                                                             
 184 For example, see Sections IV. A. & B., generally discussing infringement 
suits brought by a UK music publisher, rights-holders to a Tom Petty song, and 
hip-hop producer DJ Mustard. 
 185 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1244. Access to a work alone can be damning 
in cases where the works in question are substantially but only incidentally simi-
lar. 
 186 Id. There is already technology that searches through music catalogues to 
identify unauthorized samples even when they have been extensively obscured in 
the recording. Duncan Geere, IPhone App Scans Your Music Collection, Identifies 
All The Samples, WIRED (June 19, 2012, 6:15 PM) https://www.wired.com/
2012/06/whosampled-app/. A similar approach could be taken to finding sound-
alikes. 
 187 See Cronin, supra note 13, at 1188. 
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the claim.188 In light of the “Blurred Lines” decision, these oppor-
tunistic litigants might be tempted to exploit profits from substantial 
similarity claims as well. 
The new—and quite valuable—market189 for electronic music is 
particularly vulnerable to the implications of this trend. Artists like 
Skrillex and Diplo are globally relevant due to their characteristic 
production styles that alone have spawned new distinct genres.190 It 
seems that in light of the “Blurred Lines” decision, these distinctive 
stylistic qualities are protected expressive material under the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach,191 and a wave of litigation surrounding these 
new genres could have a potentially massive impact on these mar-
kets. 
The industry is already reacting to the potential infringement li-
ability in “ripping off” another artist’s style, and some suggest the 
“Blurred Lines” decision is to blame.192 In a truly bizarre situation, 
hip-hop producer DJ Mustard claimed that “Fancy” by Iggy Azalea 
and “Classic Man” by Jidenna were rip-offs of his signature produc-
tion style that has dominated West Coast hip-hop for the last few 
years.193 It is quite obvious that both songs are heavily influenced 
by Mustard, and both beats sound like his productions.194 But even 
though Mustard was the originator, he received no credit on either 
song.195 Instead, Jidenna’s publishers gave co-songwriting credits to 
                                                                                                             
 188 See Sternburg, supra note 50; see also Wu supra note 16. 
 189 Glenn Peoples, Global EDM Market Hits $6.9 Billion, BILLBOARD (May 
22, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6575901/global-edm-mar-
ket-hits-69-billion. 
 190 Gigen Mammoser, We Talked to a Lawyer About How the “Blurred Lines” 
Verdict Will Impact Copyright Law in Dance Music, THUMP (Oct. 15, 2015, 11:31 
AM), https://thump.vice.com/en_us/article/we-talked-to-a-lawyer-about-how-
the-blurred-lines-verdict-will-impact-copyright-law-in-dance-music. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See Tom Breihan, DJ Mustard Thinks “Fancy” And “Classic Man” 
Ripped Him Off, Which, Duh, STEREOGUM (Aug. 19, 2015, 10:34 AM), 
http://www.stereogum.com/1825100/dj-mustard-thinks-fancy-and-classic-man-
ripped-him-off-which-duh/wheres-the-beef/; Andrew Unterberger, Janelle Mo-
nae on Iggy Azalea Controversy: ‘She Steal From Us, We Steal Back’, SPIN (Aug. 
15 2015), http://www.spin.com/2015/08/janelle-monae-jidenna-iggy-azalea-clas-
sic-man-steal-fancy/; Christman, supra note 165. 
 193 Breihan, supra note 192. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
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Iggy Azalea and her collaborators to avoid an infringement dispute 
when both had clearly copied Mustard.196 Jidenna said in an inter-
view that his team’s decision to give Azalea and her collaborators 
writing credit on “Classic Man” was to avoid a “Blurred Lines” type 
litigation.197 
Unless there is a major change to the current substantial similar-
ity framework, these increasingly ridiculous disputes will only be-
come more common. By using infringement claims as a new low-
risk-high-reward revenue stream, the industry is thinning its already 
narrow margins and fueling apprehension in new music investment. 
In an industry built on creativity and innovation, the potential 
chilling effects of this practice on new music investment could have 
far reaching implications on the industry’s sustainability. Broad 
standards and unpredictable decisions only make infringement mon-
etization a more alluring revenue opportunity for industry partici-
pants, and the need for short-term profits may outweigh the desire 
to avoid the strategy’s long term effects. 
Not only is modern substantial similarity doctrine inconsistent 
with historical precedent, but it also runs contrary to the constitu-
tional goals of copyright.198 By not addressing these issues, courts 
are doing more to stifle innovation than promote it. The scope of 
copyright protection has expanded immensely since its inception, 
and the creative industries are worse off for it. In light of these policy 
and economic implications, the Court should overhaul judicial ap-
proaches to substantial similarity claims. 
V. POSSIBLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
The destructive implications of current substantial similarity 
tests are by no means exclusive concerns of the music industry, and 
all creative industries are potentially at risk for damaging waves of 
attenuated infringement litigation.199 By stretching already impre-
cise tests to cover all copyrightable media, the current framework 
fails to address the particular creative and industrial needs of each 
                                                                                                             
 196 Id. 
 197 Unterberger, supra note 192. 
 198 “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” Congress may grant 
authors “the exclusive Right to their respective” works. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8. 
 199 See generally Williams, supra note 14. 
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sector.200 While some music law critics suggest solutions primarily 
focused on the system’s application to music, this Note offers a com-
prehensive solution that would hopefully help addresses the needs 
of all creative industries. To truly fix music copyright, copyright in 
general should change. 
Commentators have suggested a plethora of potential legal solu-
tions to the problems in the modern substantial similarity frame-
work.201 Even though the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic–intrinsic test is 
an influential—and regrettably problematic—approach, similar is-
sues are common in doctrines across all the circuits.202 Three com-
mon categories of proposals have persisted over time, each address-
ing different perceived issues in the system.203 The following section 
evaluates these proposed solutions and their effects on music law, 
concluding that a blended system utilizing helpful elements from 
each is the most promising approach. Many of the suggestions dis-
cussed below were proposed as alternatives to the extrinsic–intrinsic 
tests, while others address the broader issues in substantial similarity 
schemes across all circuits. 
A. Change the Standards and Tests 
Critics of modern substantial similarity standards often suggest 
a major change to the fundamental judicial tests.204 It is undeniable 
that current tests are confusing to jurors and produce unpredictable 
                                                                                                             
 200  
(a) Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression . . . Works of authorship include the following cat-
egories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying 
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes 
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural 
works. 
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). Software is also protected, but through analogy as a lit-
erary work. 
 201 See Eric Rogers, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical Examination of Cop-
yright Substantial Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 893, 915 (2013); Roodhuyzen, supra note 120, at 1412–18. 
 202 See Rogers, supra note 201, at 895. 
 203 See id. at 915. 
 204 See Roodhuyzen, supra note 120, at 1412–18. 
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and sometimes inequitable results.205 To modernize the current in-
fringement regime, courts will almost certainly need to update their 
tests and standards. Opinions differ, however, on what form these 
changes should take; some recommend alterations to the current 
framework, while others suggest eliminating the tests entirely.206 
For example, Michael Sharb has proposed a five-step modified 
“total concept and feel” analysis, while Lawrence Sher has sug-
gested a four-step alternative to the system.207 In his review of the 
Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic–intrinsic system, Montgomery Frankel 
suggests that the court adopt a single-prong analysis that simply 
asks: “Did defendant copy plaintiff’s protected expression?”208 He 
claims that similarities in “total concept and feel” are completely 
irrelevant if the defendant did not copy the plaintiff’s protected ex-
pression.209 Additionally, he believes that juries should be instructed 
to objectively evaluate the works but have the autonomy to weigh 
all relevant factors as they see fit.210 
Those who recommend eliminating tests altogether believe 
courts should revert to copyright’s constitutional purpose—promo-
tion of the useful arts and sciences.211 According to these critics, 
courts should, instead of applying convoluted comparison tests, 
simply determine whether judgment for the plaintiff would further 
constitutional policy goals and legislative intent.212 Application of 
these principles should, in theory, lead to more equitable decisions 
and limit the scope of copyright as to promote innovation. However 
alluring this approach, empirical data shows that without a defined 
test, decisions are far less predictable and more likely to be reversed 
                                                                                                             
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Both proposals separate the question of idea and expression as to clearly 
distinguish between the protectable and un-protectable elements. Michael L. 
Sharb, Getting a “Total Concept and Feel” of Copyright Infringement, 64 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 903, 920 (1993); Lawrence Jeffrey Sher, The Search for a Suitable 
Standard of Substantial Similarity, The Ninth Circuit’s Application of the Krofft 
Test, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 229, 257–61 (1991). 
 208 Frankel, supra note 120, at 454–57 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Rogers, supra note 201, at 915–16; Roodhuyzen, supra note 120, at 1412. 
 212 Roodhuyzen, supra note 120, at 1419. 
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on appeal.213 Eliminating tests entirely would exacerbate the ineffi-
cacies its proponents seek to resolve.214 
While updating judicial tests is clearly a necessary step to fixing 
the substantial similarity system, changes to the frameworks alone 
would not solve other pervasive issues in the regime. In general, 
flexible standards meant to cover all media of copyrightable works 
fall short in that they fail to address the unique needs of each creative 
arena. Furthermore, these blanket standards fall behind the times 
and are quickly rendered obsolete in light of morphing creative land-
scapes. In the modern era, creative cultures evolve far quicker than 
legal frameworks, leaving them inapplicable to the industries they 
seek to regulate. As discussed above, application of these overarch-
ing tests to music compositions often produces decisions that are 
bizarrely out of touch with modern songwriting culture. The kind of 
creative work being evaluated in a dispute has a substantial effect 
on the case’s outcome, and switching one broad principle for an-
other fails to address these important issues.215 
B. Juries and Experts 
Detractors frequently critique the pervasive adoption of the “lay 
listener” and “intended audience” tests by many circuits.216 Clearly, 
lay juries are ill-qualified to evaluate the creative works in ques-
tion—that is in fact what makes them lay juries. These critics believe 
that juries composed of those already familiar with the expressive 
medium would make more consistent and equitable decisions when 
applying the current framework.217 Other commentators claim that 
admitting expert testimony on all aspects of infringement disputes 
would solve many problems with the lay listener tests.218 Experts 
                                                                                                             
 213 The Eleventh Circuit is the only court that has yet to expound a defined test 
for substantial similarity. In his empirical study on the matter, Eric Rogers found 
that Eleventh Circuit decisions were less predictable and more likely to be re-
versed than the other Circuits. Rogers, supra note 201, at 921, 925. 
 214 See id. 
 215 Id. at 926–27. 
 216 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 79, at 63–65. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Rogers, supra note 201, at 917–18. 
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would clarify how the operative test applies to the medium in ques-
tion and do their best to educate jurors on esoteric aspects of the 
evaluation.219 
In her article Fixing Music Copyright, Jamie Lund argues that 
the “intended audience” for musical compositions are in fact musi-
cians who are fluent in written music rather than the general pub-
lic.220 Her studies showed that lay listeners were substantially less 
accurate than versed musicians in their evaluation of musical simi-
larities and that exposure to expert testimony did little to improve 
their abilities.221 Similarly, in his empirical study on the subject, Eric 
Rogers found that allowance of expert testimony had minimal effect 
on substantial similarity decisions across the circuits in general.222 
He concluded that expert testimony either fails to properly inform 
juries, or jurors effectively disregard expert evidence.223 Under ei-
ther condition, allowance of expert testimony alone is not properly 
effective.224 
However, it is sensible to believe that a jury composed of those 
versed in the particular media in question would likely return more 
accurate and predictable decisions. Changes to jury composition has 
a substantial impact on the accuracy of music infringement analysis, 
suggesting that the lay listener test is fundamentally flawed.225 How-
ever, it would not be practical to call juries composed only of artists 
in the medium. Additionally, without changing the underlying tests, 
experts and educated jurors are still mired in the same convoluted 
standards applied today.226 As evidenced by the expert testimony in 
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 220 In her opinion, written musical notation—i.e. compositions—are intended 
for the musically literate audience. Lund, supra note 79, at 63. 
 221 Id. at 86–88. 
 222 Rogers, supra note 201, at 928–29. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 See Lund, supra note 79, at 86–88 
 226 See, e.g., Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK 
(AGRx), 2014 WL 7877773, at *12–17 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 
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Williams, imprecise underlying judicial standards can lead even ex-
perts to improper analytical conclusions.227 Outcomes might gener-
ally be more informed, but the issue of overall consistency and pre-
dictability remains. 
C. One Court 
Another common recommendation is vesting jurisdiction for 
copyright claims in one appellate court.228 Doing so would eliminate 
the patchwork of tests applied across the circuits, leading to more 
predictable outcomes and discouraging forum shopping.229 With ex-
clusive jurisdiction over copyright disputes, the court would gain 
familiarity with the subject matter and develop clearer standards 
from a more experienced perspective.230 Empirical data supports 
this position231 as choice of law has a substantial impact on the out-
come of infringement disputes, and centralizing judicial jurisdiction 
might resolve this inconsistency.232 
This suggestion is quite alluring to those who believe that many 
of copyright’s ills arise from the court’s inexperience with the cul-
tures and industries of the creative media they review. By centraliz-
ing jurisdiction, the new appeals court could focus on developing 
more coherent tests and clarify their application to the varying me-
diums of copyrightable expression. As copyrights become increas-
ingly valuable assets in the modern economy, law surrounding their 
infringement may require more devoted judicial attention than the 
varying circuits can provide. 
However, this proposal is not without its pitfalls. Many criticize 
Congress’ decision to centralize the patent appeals system, claiming 
that the Federal Circuit has done more to obfuscate the law than 
clarify it.233 For example, in 2014 the Supreme Court heard six ap-
peals from the Federal Circuit—the most ever—and reversed five of 
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those decisions.234 This seems to indicate that a centralized copy-
right court could fall victim to the same issues as circuit courts, and 
inconsistency might just be replaced by consistently wrong deci-
sions. 
D. This Author’s Suggestion: A Blended Solution 
The difficulty in developing a system for comprehensive sub-
stantial similarity reform is that any effective proposal will have to 
be multifaceted. Isolated changes to the framework would only ad-
dress isolated issues, and as it stands, the problems in substantial 
similarity law vary across a number of different doctrines. Even 
more challenging is determining how these changes should be im-
plemented; inconsistency across the circuits begs an overarching so-
lution. 
Heading patent’s warning, the copyright community should be 
wary of centralizing its appellate process. It would be more appro-
priate for the Supreme Court to resolve these issues by granting cer-
tiorari to a group of substantial similarity claims covering a variety 
of media—“The Copyright Cases.” The Court could take this oppor-
tunity to articulate clear and appropriate jurisprudence for substan-
tial similarity cases while still allowing for interpretative innovation 
between the circuits. With input from the respective creative indus-
tries, the Court could expound doctrines that are more in line with 
modern creative cultures and industries. Blended from the proposals 
of other commentators, this Note provides four suggestions that 
might inform this restructuring. 
First, and most importantly, the Court should no longer utilize 
the substantial similarity doctrine and instead apply a gross similar-
ity standard. In this context “gross similarity” would mean: inexcus-
able similarity on almost all factors and criteria. This may seem like 
a drastic proposal, but it would be quite consistent with modern cre-
ative culture. Because substantial similarity between works will in-
evitably arise given the staggering rate of current creative output, a 
gross similarity standard properly reflects the narrow scope of pro-
tection that should be extended to these less rarified works. This is 
not to say that plaintiffs would be limited to actions against repro-
duction of their work in total. Rights-holders could still bring suit 
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for unlicensed appropriation of major, significant portions of their 
work but could no longer base claims on such attenuated differences 
as are allowable today. 
Second, there should be no subjective considerations in deter-
mining infringement, and all observations should be made from an 
objective standpoint. This would bring copyright decisions in line 
with other areas of the law which generally require objective fact 
finding. Objective tests would hopefully lead to more predictable 
outcomes and assuage some of the mounting anxiety surrounding 
these disputes that leads to preemptive settlements. Allowing jurors 
to consider their own subjective opinions leaves too much oppor-
tunity for misapplication of the law and capricious decisions. On 
appeal, defendants have almost no grounds to challenge subjective 
findings, and judges almost always uphold the jury decision. 
Third, expert testimony and extrinsic evidence should be al-
lowed on all factual matters at issue. Even though expert input seems 
to have little impact on jury decisions in these cases so far, their 
testimonies may carry more weight when applied during purely ob-
jective analysis. By allowing experts to clarify the application of 
tests to the media under review, jury decisions might better conform 
to the cultural understandings and creative needs of that industry. 
Calling juries composed entirely of artists is not a practical sugges-
tion, but lay juries should be able to consider their opinions. A viable 
approach might be to allow for survey results from a statistically 
sampled group of those familiar with the relevant medium of expres-
sion. Juries could consider these surveys as a factor in their determi-
nation, but they would not have to be outcome determinative. 
Fourth, courts should apply different tests for different catego-
ries of media. A fundamental issue with current substantial similar-
ity tests is that they are not easily applied across all mediums of cop-
yrightable expression. But, it would be impractical for the court to 
expound eight different tests and clarify the application of each to 
their respective mediums. Instead, the court should identify catego-
ries of copyrightable expression that are similar enough in their cre-
ative features that one test could suffice. Each category would center 
around the most important authorial features of each medium and be 
paired with the most appropriate test for analyzing those features. 
Consider for example these categories and their respective tests: 
278 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:238 
 
1. Literary, Dramatic, and Narrative Works: Abstrac-
tions Test235 
2. Software and Technology Literature: Extrinsic 
Filtration Analysis 236 
3. Visual Arts, Sculpture, and Architecture: Total 
Concept and Feel 237 
4. Music, Choreography, and Performance Art: Ana-
lytical Dissection 238 
It is true that at times these categories would overlap when ap-
plied to certain works as the case would be for video games. Under 
these circumstances, the court would consider the narrative features 
of the work under an abstractions test, the visual components under 
total concept and feel, and the software component under a filtration 
test. Facially this may come across as cumbersome, but it is actually 
a clearer system for jurors to follow. 
Separating analysis on these factors would give jurors a more 
nuanced understanding of the works at issue, hopefully leading to 
more accurate decisions. This would also depend on what expressive 
components are actually at issue in the dispute. For example, if a 
plaintiff were to accuse a defendant of infringing on the plaintiff’s 
protected original melody, the jury would only consider evidence of 
similarity as to that specific feature rather than the works as a whole. 
Total concept and feel when applied to protected arrangements over- 
expands the probative value of that expressive feature and may even 
trivialize similarities that alone could rise to level of infringement. 
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This system would limit the scope of copyright allotted to pro-
tected works based on the type of authorship they exercise, recog-
nizing the distinct creative needs of each media. When drafting these 
tests, the court should consider input from those versed in each cat-
egory and tailor instructions as to fit the cultural and industrial un-
derstandings of each. Hopefully when combined with an objective 
gross similarity standard and extrinsic evidence, these categoriza-
tions would properly guide juries through their analysis, producing 
more equitable and predictable decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
It has become abundantly clear that the U.S. copyright regime is 
in dire need of fundamental restructuring, and Congress seems 
poised to comprehensively reevaluate the Copyright Act for the first 
time since 1976 in the near future.239 Even though creatives will 
warmly welcome this long awaited reform, legislators are unlikely 
to address issues in the substantial similarity system. Even though 
the music industry is profoundly injured by the current framework, 
it is not remotely an industry exclusive issue. All creative industries 
have evolved in recent years, and the law has failed to catch up. In 
light of this reality, courts, creatives, and industry-people alike must 
take responsibility for the distressing condition of modern copyright 
and work towards sustainable solutions attainable without Congres-
sional action. 
First, all circuits should reexamine their current approach to in-
fringement claims in great detail and—hopefully with the guidance 
of experts—work to develop clearer tests that reflect the modern 
creative climate. Because of their influential position in the copy-
right arena, the Second and Ninth Circuits should lead this refor-
mation and outline clear precedents that address the fundamental is-
sues of substantial similarity doctrine. Furthermore, courts should 
seriously consider eliminating the substantial similarity doctrine in 
favor of a gross similarity standard to bring the scope of copyright 
in line with decreasing creative rarity. 
Additionally, creatives and industry entities need to take respon-
sibility for the self-destructive trend of monetizing infringement lit-
igation potential. The music industry is particularly guilty of this 
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practice and exacerbates its own woes by doing so. Musicians, rec-
ord labels, publishers, and rights-holders need to commit themselves 
to a fundamental cultural change or risk destroying themselves from 
the inside. By continuously exploiting one another through attenu-
ated infringement claims, industry players are only raising barriers 
to entry and adding more uncertainty to their already precarious in-
vestment market. To that same end, artists and industry entities do 
themselves more harm than good by grabbing at songwriter credits 
and forcing inequitable settlements. These disputes limit the scope 
of permissive creative influence and turn traditionally acceptable 
composition techniques into theft. In an industry centered on crea-
tive innovation, business practices that chill that innovation may 
have long-term negative implications that greatly outweigh the op-
portunity for short-term profit. 
